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Human Rights Treaties in State Courts: The




Subnational implementation of human rights law has been the
subject of increasing interest among scholars and litigators in recent
years, building on the call for independent state constitutionalism' and
the rise of New Federalism. 2 For state constitutionalists, international
human rights law provides a legitimating source for articulating state
constitutional principles not captured in federal constitutional law. For
human rights advocates, state courts provide an alternative and possibly
friendlier forum for some of these kinds of claims. With the prominent
success of some of these international and comparative arguments, state
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.
Thanks to the Penn State Law Review and the Symposium participants for their guidance
and assistance. Particular thanks to Davida Finger, Lawrence Friedman, John Lovett, and
Robert Williams. This project benefited from the research assistance of Geoffrey
Sweeney and the able administrative assistance of Lindsey Reed. All remaining errors
are my own.
1. This movement began with Justice William Brennan's call for state courts to
"step into the breach" created by the United States Supreme Court's limited commitment
to the protection of individual rights. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977). See also William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986).
2. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New
Federalism: Lessons From Coordination, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1185, 1190-92 (2008)
(describing the "resurgence" of interest in federalism both in the courts and in the broader
political discourse).
3. Among the most widely discussed of these decisions were the California
Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage Cases, which cited inter alia to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in support of its holding that marriage is a basic civil right, 183 P.3d 384,
426 n.41 (Cal. 2008), and the Missouri Supreme Court's decision finding the juvenile
death penalty unconstitutional, presaging the United States Supreme Court's decision in
the same case. See Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 411 (Mo. 2003) (referencing the
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court decisions applying international human rights law have become the
subject of systematic study and coordinated advocacy efforts.4
The space for independent state action to implement international
human rights law may have been limited somewhat by the Supreme
Court's 2008 decision in Medellin v. Texas.' That opinion contains
language suggesting that non-self-executing treaties, including ratified
human rights treaties, do not even have the status of domestic law absent
implementing legislation.6  Under this view of the non-self-execution
doctrine, states are under no obligation to respect or enforce even ratified
treaty law until it is implemented through federal legislation. Despite the
outpouring of scholarship suggesting that the Court's language should
not be interpreted this broadly,7 this view of the non-self-execution
doctrine is becoming the law on the ground, at least in state courts.8
Convention on the Rights of the Child and "other international treaties and agreements
[that] expressly prohibit the practice.").
4. The Opportunity Agenda has begun to comprehensively review state courts'
opinions for their use of human rights law. THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN STATE COURTs: AN OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL ADVOCACY (2008),
available at http://opportunityagenda.org/report state-courts-and human-rights_2008
edition.
5. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
6. The Court stated, "What we mean by 'self-executing' is that the treaty has
automatic domestic effect . .. upon ratification. Conversely, a 'non-self-executing' treaty
does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law." Medellin, 552 U.S.
at 505 n. 2. See also id. at 504 ("This Court has long recognized the distinction between
treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that-while they
constitute international law commitments-do not by themselves function as binding
federal law").
7. Curtis Bradley, for example, acknowledges that the Court's statements could be
viewed as stating that treaties "have no domestic law status at all," but contends that the
decision should be interpreted to mean only that non-self-executing treaties are not
judicially-enforceable. Curtis Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing
Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 540, 541, 548-50 (2008). See also Curtis A. Bradley, Self-
Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 164-81.
8. For example, a Florida court, citing Medellin, rejected a challenge based on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR], on the grounds that absent federal implementing legislation, the
treaty had no domestic effect.
The ICCPR was ratified subject to a declaration of non-execution. As such,
appellant has no judicially enforceable right directly arising out of a challenge
to the ICCPR as it would be interpreted by its signatory nations; his argument
can attack only the breadth of United States law implementing the treaty. This
case does not involve such an attack. Until the treaty is implemented through
congressional action, it cannot act as a limitation on the power of the Florida
Legislature to determine the appropriate penalties for violations of the law.
Graham v. State, 982 So.2d 43, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted), rev'd,
130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010). The Florida court's interpretation of the Medellin decision was
then adopted by a court in California. See People v. See, No. F055800, 2009 WL
4882677 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2009), review denied Mar. 30, 2010. See also Parrish v.
Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 161, 180 (Ky. 2008) ("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has
recently reiterated that to be binding on the states, treaties must be either self-executing
1052 [Vol. 115:4
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My purpose here is to determine what effect this reading of
Medellin would have on the future of international state
constitutionalism. To do so, I study the conditions under which state
jurists have engaged with the international human rights treaties the
United States has signed or ratified, in order to consider whether and
how these interactions will be affected by this new understanding of the
status of treaty law. I begin in Part II by briefly reviewing the different
paths through which human rights treaty law could be raised in state
court cases. I then turn in Part III to surveying the activity on the
ground. I examine the state cases that cite these treaties in order to
identify when and how state courts engage substantively with these
instruments. This in turn provides insight into possible advocacy
strategies for increasing state court consideration of treaty norms.
Finally, in Part IV, I consider these findings to assess how the Medellin
decision will impact the international prospects of state
constitutionalism. I conclude that because state courts have been more
receptive to arguments based on treaty instruments as non-binding,
persuasive authority, even the broadest reading of Medellin will not end
this type of human rights advocacy.
II. PATHS TO STATE COURT CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES
Even prior to Medellin, state participation in treaty implementation
was complicated by the doctrinal uncertainty surrounding the status of
these treaties in domestic law, as well as the mixed messages that the
federal government had sent to the states as to their role in implementing
these instruments. As a formal matter, not all human rights treaties have
equal status in United States law. There are some treaties that the United
States has signed, but that have not been adopted by the Senate.9 Then
there are instruments that the United States has signed and ratified, but
that have not been implemented through federal legislation.o Finally,
or carried out by way of legislation. The International Covenant is neither self-executing
nor has it been implemented by way of domestic legislation.") (citations omitted).
9. This group includes the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CESCR]; the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, July 17, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14
[hereinafter CEDAW]; the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Mar. 30, 2007, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
10. This group includes the International Convention on the Elimination on all
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD];
and the ICCPR.
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there are treaties that have been signed, ratified, and implemented
through federal legislation."
As the "supreme Law of the Land," 2 ratified international human
rights treaties would seem to have a stronger case for domestic
enforceability in state courts than the instruments that have not yet been
approved by the Senate. Nonetheless, a variety of procedural barriers
make this story far more complicated. The international human rights
treaties that have been ratified were adopted with provisions rendering
them non-self-executing, which has been interpreted to mean that they
cannot supply the cause of action in federal court.13  Scholars have
argued, however, that even if these treaties do not supply the cause of
action, they must be considered and enforced once a cause of action is
established through another channel.14
For example, "[a] right of action is not necessary to invoke a treaty
as a defense. . .. Thus, a defendant being prosecuted or sued under a
state or prior federal law that is inconsistent with a treaty is entitled to
invoke the treaty in court to nullify the state or federal law without
having to show that the treaty confers a private right of action."
Additionally, rights protected by a non-self-executing treaty may
arguably be raised via another statute "that provide[s] a cause of action
for the vindication of federal rights."' 6 For example, "42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides an action against anyone who, under color of state law, deprives
a person of rights guaranteed by federal law, which would include
11. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention];
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340(B), 1456 U.N.T.S. 85.
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
13. There is a long-standing academic debate over the legality of these reservations.
See, e.g., Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280-82 (Nev. 1998) (both majority and
dissent consider the legality of the reservation to the ICCPR); William A. Schabas,
Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the
United States Still a Party? 21 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 277, 318-19 (1995). Nonetheless,
most courts seem to have accepted their validity.
14. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and
International Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 359, 370-71 (2006)
("Even if a treaty is deemed non-self-executing, the United States and its constituent
states are still bound by it. As such, a court considering the legality of government action
must take such treaty obligations into account. Even on the federal level, the non-self-
executing nature of a treaty simply precludes private enforcement action and use of the
treaty to secure jurisdiction. It does not bar judicial consideration and enforcement of the
treaty's terms once a cause of action and jurisdiction is secured on some other basis."
(citations omitted)).
15. Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1143 (1992) (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 197 (1961);
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145 (1914)).
16. William M. Carter, Jr., Treaties as Law and the Rule ofLaw: The Judicial Power
to Compel Domestic Treaty Implementation, 69 MD. L. REv. 344, 346 (2010).
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ratified treaties."17  The habeas corpus statute also permits relief to be
granted in cases where custody is determined to be "in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 8 These types of
arguments have been met with mixed success in state courts.19
Perhaps because of the complexities inherent in "hard" law
applications of international human rights treaties even prior to Medellin,
most scholars in the area have focused on possible "soft" law uses of
these treaties by state courts, and particularly on their use in state
constitutional interpretation.20 For example, Professor Martha Davis has
suggested that international human rights treaty law may be particularly
pertinent in helping state jurists to contextualize and understand the
positive rights embodied in state constitutions "that have no federal
analogues but that are similar to international human rights law and to
provisions of modern constitutions around the world."2 1 This use of
17. Id. at 346 n. 8.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
19. In the criminal context, some courts have been willing to consider challenges to
particular penalties based on the ICCPR and CERD, although none have concluded that
these treaties prevent the imposition of a constitutional punishment. See, e.g., infra n. 25
and accompanying text. Other courts simply state that because these treaties are non-self-
executing, they may not be raised by a private party (even in her own defense). See infra
note 26. 1 have not been able to locate many examples where courts have been asked to
indirectly enforce these rights on behalf of a private party outside the criminal context,
and in the cases that do exist, the treaty argument is usually somewhat farfetched. See,
e.g., Application of Griffiths, 294 A.2d 281, 289-90 (Conn. 1972) (rejecting bar
applicant's argument that CEDAW principles are violated by state rule preventing non-
U.S. citizens from becoming members of the CT bar), rev'd on other grounds, 413 U.S.
717 (1973). The Medellin decision may have cleared up the confusion around self-
execution by finding that non-self-executing treaties have no domestic effect absent
implementing legislation. This would appear to close the door on treaty enforcement in
state courts via an alternative cause of action. Moreover, it would also remove the
obligation (and mandate) for state level enforcement of treaty guarantees through the
executive and legislative branches. See generally Johanna Kalb, The Persistence of
Dualism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation, forthcoming YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
(forthcoming 2011). In other words, following Medellin, there is arguably no difference
from the state perspective between ratified and unratified treaties.
20. See generally Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent
Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Points of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1627-29
(2006); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for
Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 275-76
(2001).
21. Davis, supra note 14, at 360. International citation by state courts also avoids
some of the criticisms that have been leveled at federal courts engaged in the practice.
First, state court engagement with these instruments tends to be related to issues of
individual rights, many of which were historically controlled by the states. Therefore, the
risk that a state court's decision would interfere with the executive's prerogative in
international law and foreign affairs is relatively slim. See id. at 377. Second, state
constitutions (either in their original form or through amendments) may reference
principles that emerge from the international human rights instruments making the norms
they embody part of the state's founding tradition, and thus, potentially, a more legitimate
2011] 1055
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international human rights treaties as persuasive evidence of applicable
norms and standards has caught the attention of advocates in a variety of
subject matter areas.
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN STATE COURTS
Despite the interest of scholars and practitioners in state court
consideration of international and transnational law claims, the available
data suggests that, at least as measured by volume of cases, state court
engagement with human rights treaties is still minimal. A search
performed in the AllStates database2 2 on Westlaw in June 2010 found
only 187 opinions in which any of these eight treaties were cited.23
Although this method is inexact,24 it gives a general sense of the limited
pool of opinions citing international human rights treaty law. The small
sample makes it hard to draw any definitive conclusions about state court
behavior; however, a few potentially useful observations are possible.
First, even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Medellin, there
appears to be some uncertainty among state judges and justices about
what level of authority the ratified treaties should be given in judicial
decision-making. Some state courts view the treaty law as binding, but
consistent with federal and state constitutional law such that any action
lawful under domestic law is automatically consistent with international
source for constitutional interpretation. Id. at 379-80. Third, "the relative populism of
state constitutions weakens accusations of countermajoritarianism in the state context."
Id. at 382. Finally, state judges may be more adept than federal judges at applying
foreign sources, given how frequently they draw upon the comparative experience of the
other American states. Thus, they are less open to the charge of "cherry-picking" only
the comparators that support their desired outcome. Id at 382-83.
22. Coverage in the ALLSTATES database begins in 1658. It includes the decisions
of the highest courts of all the states that were part of the union prior to 1948, the year in
which the UDHR-the oldest instrument studied here-was adopted. It also includes
decisions from at least some of the lower courts of all the states and the District of
Columbia, but the times at which coverage of these courts begins varies greatly.
23. The citations break down is as follows: the ICCPR was cited 118 times; the CAT
was cited 24 times; the CRC was cited sixteen times; the Genocide Convention was cited
four times; CEDAW was cited four times; the ICESCR was cited three times; the CERD
was cited sixteen times; and the CRPD was cited once.
24. This snapshot may not represent a complete picture of state court citation of
these treaties because some of the decisions may not be published or available on
Westlaw. See supra note 23. This search also fails to catch instances in which courts
referred to the treaties differently, like, for example, referencing the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights, or as the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See
State v. Robert H, 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (N.H. 1978), overruled in part by In re Craig T.,
800 A.2d 819 (N.H. 2002). Finally, these are not all discrete cases. In some instances,
the treaty was referred to in the opinions of multiple courts addressing the same case and
some cases reference more than one treaty. Nonetheless, even without a precise count, it
is clear that the pool is extremely small.
1056 [Vol. 115:4
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law.2 5 Others simply reject entirely the notion that treaty-based claims
can be raised by private parties.26 The complexities go beyond the self-
execution debate, however, as state courts attempt to understand their
own particular relationship with these treaties. Justice Houston drew
attention to this problem in a concurring opinion in Ex parte Pressley,2 7 a
case in which the court was asked to invalidate the death sentence of a
juvenile offender based on the ICCPR.2 8 The majority relied upon a
ratification reservation which reserved for "[t]he United States" the
ability to impose capital punishment on any person other than a pregnant
woman "subject to its constitutional constraints."29 Justice Houston, in
concurrence, noted that "the United States" was referred to as single
entity and he thus expressed his concern that the reservation was
applicable only to the federal government. 3 0 Nonetheless, he reluctantly
joined the majority's conclusion, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had
denied a petition for certiorari in a similar case from the Nevada
Supreme Court, which split 3-2 in rejecting the juvenile defendant's
claim that his execution violated the ICCPR."
Uncertainty with how international human rights law claims should
be treated in state courts may partially explain the somewhat odd pattern
in which they appear. Although one might expect citations to ratified
treaties (as the law of the land) to be far more frequent than the unratified
treaties, the pattern is actually more complex. The ratified treaties are
cited more often than the unratified treaties; however, the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, which is a non-binding aspirational
statement of shared principles, is cited both more frequently than any of
25. See, e.g., People v. Alfaro, 163 P.3d 118, 157 (Cal. 2008) ("International law
does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal
constitutional and statutory requirements") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359, 401 (Wash. 2007) ("Yates has not explained why
the treaty's clauses should be read more broadly than the Eighth Amendment") (citations
omitted).
26. See Abdullah v. Warden-Cheshire, No. CV010457822, 2009 WL 1140526, at * 6
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2009); Kaenel v. Maricopa Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1 CA-CV
08-0043, 2008 WL 4814283 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2008).
27. Exparte Pressley, 770 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 2000).
28. Id. at 147-48, 150-51.
29. Id. at 148.
30. Federalism is alive and well. The United States Constitution binds me as a
Supreme Court Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama to abide by the
ICCPR, Article 6(5), and not to impose the sentence of death on Pressley for
the crimes committed when he was 16 years of age. I am not persuaded that
the Senate's reservation, if not invalid for other reasons, frees me as a state
justice, as opposed to a federal justice or judge, from the treaty's restriction
against the imposition of a sentence of death for a crime committed by a person
below the age of 18 years.
Id at 150-51 (Houston, J. concurring).
31. Id. at 151 (citing Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998)).
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the ratified treaties with the exception of the ICCPR and more often than
any of the signed but as yet unratified treaties. 32 Moreover, as discussed
below, 33 persuasive citations to the UDHR have arguably had more direct
impact on the outcomes of the cases in which they were raised than
references to the ratified treaties.
Some of the cases suggest actual confusion among jurists (or
perhaps among the parties appearing before them) about the status of
these instruments in domestic law. In In re Julie Anne,34 an Ohio court
held that parents were restrained from smoking in front of minor child.35
The court noted that under the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC), courts of law, state legislatures, and administrative
agencies have a duty as a matter of human rights law to reduce children's
compelled exposure to tobacco smoke. But the court mistakenly
suggested that the CRC had been ratified by the U.S. 37  In other
instances, state courts' ambiguity about the treaty's status may be
purposeful. In a 2007 case by the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, the court
relied on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to reach its holding that the
state constitutional right to privacy does not prevent the criminalization
of prostitution.38 The court noted that the consensus in the international
community is that prostitution has negative consequences, and that the
U.S. has agreed to "take all appropriate measures, including legislation,
to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution
of women." 39 The court did not explain, however, that the U.S. has
failed to ratify CEDAW, despite noting that several other countries have
ratified it and referencing a link to the UN Division on the Advancement
of Women that explains the status of the treaty in each state.4 0 Thus, it
seems plausible that the court wished to downplay the treaty's formal
status.
To the extent that the human rights treaties do appear in state court
jurisprudence, they are only rarely used as scholars have suggested as a
source for non-binding but persuasive authority in state constitutional or
statutory interpretation. The frequency with which these treaties are
32. The UDHR had been cited 52 times in available state court decisions as of June
20tO.
33. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
34. In re Julie Anne, 780 N.E.2d 635 (Ohio Com. Pl. 2002).
35. Id at 659.
36. Id. at 652.
37. Id. ("The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by
almost 200 countries including the United States ... ).
38. See State v. Romano, 155 P.3d 1102, 1115 (Haw. 2007).
39. Id. at 1114 n.14 (quoting Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980)).
40. Roman, 155 P.3d at 1114.
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cited appears to have increased over the years, 41 but the change has
predominately resulted from an increase in the parties' reliance on these
instruments as binding authority that prohibits the imposition of a
particular type of criminal sanction.42 Although the parties have often
been quite creative in their framing of these arguments, courts around the
country have generally been dismissive of the claim that they are bound
by even the ratified instruments, although the reasons for their rejection
of these sources have varied.
Viewed with a wide lens, therefore, the practice of international
state constitutionalism still appears to be limited. Nonetheless, a more
detailed examination of the cases suggests they have had an impact that
is significant and disproportionate to their numbers. Whether accepted
or rejected by the courts, treaty-based arguments offer openings for
embedding these instruments into the domestic rights discourse in ways
that appear to have tangible results. Despite their relative infrequency,
these cases both individually and collectively appear to have been quite
meaningful. Therefore, it is worth continuing to develop a more nuanced
understanding of the practice.43
A. International Treaty Law as Persuasive
There is a small but significant group of opinions in which state
courts have used international human rights treaties in the informative
but non-binding way that most scholars have envisioned. The most
prominent are those decided by state appellate and high courts on
controversial or challenging issues of state constitutional interpretation.
These include the previously-referenced California Supreme Court's
decision on same-sex marriage which cited to the ICCPR,4 4 the Missouri
Supreme Court's reliance on the CRC to strike down the juvenile death
penalty,45 and the Oregon Supreme Court's references to the UDHR, the
ICCPR, and the European Convention to interpret a state constitutional
provision governing the treatment of the incarcerated.46 However, it is
not just the most high-profile and politically charged cases where
international human rights law has been valuable. In a custody hearing
41. Of the 187 citations, all but 25 have occurred since January 1, 2000. This trend
may also be attributable to the increasing electronic accessibility of state court opinions.
42. Usually, these challenges occur in the criminal context and most are to the
imposition of the death penalty or the sentencing of a juvenile to life without the
possibility of parole. Citations to the ICCPR make up over half of the pool and the vast
majority of these occur in criminal cases.
43. The Opportunity Agenda helpfully provides a state-by-state review of the use of
international human rights law in state courts. See supra note 4.
44. See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 747, 819 n. 41 (Cal. 2008).
45. See Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 411 (Mo. 2003).
46. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 132 n. 21 (Or. 1981).
10592011]
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in a New York family court in 2008, the court referenced the principles
of the CRC in interpreting the Family Court Act to require age
appropriate consultation with the child at a permanency hearing.47 The
court relied on the CRC provision as evidence of a widespread norm
toward permitting the participation of a child in proceedings that affect
him and thus interpreted the statute consistently with the treaty. 4 8 In
another New York case, the court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the
United States' obligations under both the ICCPR and the CRPD4 9 in
reading a New York guardianship statute to require "periodic review to
prevent the abuses which may otherwise flow from the state's grant of
power over a person with disabilities."50 Thus, international human
rights law may prove a useful tool in rights advocacy at all levels.
Although tracking the treaty's path into the court's analysis is
difficult, two identifiable sources are apparent from the study. First,
these "soft law" uses of treaty law seem to occur most frequently when
the writing judge or justice is one who adopts a strong vision of
independent state constitutionalism. Second, and perhaps quite
obviously, this methodology succeeds when it has previously been
successful in other state or federal courts.
1. Receptive Judges
Identifying the role that a judge or justice plays in the case analysis
is challenging, especially given that for many state court decisions, the
parties' briefings are not electronically available. Nonetheless, there are
some correlations that can be drawn based on an external understanding
of the jurist's philosophy or judging. There are a handful of state judges
who have written about the use of international and comparative sources
and, not coincidentally, some of them have authored opinions that
employ these strategies.51 For example, retired Chief Justice Margaret H.
47. See In re Pedro M., 864 N.Y.S.2d 869, 871 n.8, (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2008).
48. Id. Similarly, in Batista v. Batista, No. FA 92 0059661, 1992 WL 156171, at *6-
7 (Conn. Super. Jun. 18, 1992), a Connecticut court considered the persuasive value of
the CRC in determining how to weigh the preferences of the child in a custody suit. The
Court expressed "great concern and embarrassment that the United States of America is
not a signator to that Convention." Id.
49. See In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433-44 (N.Y. County Sur. Ct. 2010).
The court acknowledged and addressed the distinction in status between the ratified
ICCPR and the signed, but not yet ratified, CPRD. See id The court explained,
however, that as a signatory to CPRD, the United States is required by the Vienna
Convention "to refrain from acts which would defeat [the Disability Convention's] object
and purpose. . . ." Id. at 433 (first alteration in original).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Thomas R. Phillips, State Supreme Courts: Local Courts in a Global
World, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 557 (2003) (authored by then-Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Texas); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World's a
1060 [Vol. 115:4
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Marshall of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has argued that
state court judges "are uniquely positioned to take advantage of the
significant potential of comparative constitutional law" because of their
expertise in drawing on the comparative experience of other American
jurisdictions, their continued work "in the open tradition of the common
law," and their role as interpreters of "'positive liberty' clauses" that
have parallels in the new constitutions of other democracies.52 Not
coincidentally, she employed this approach in Goodridge v. Department
of Public Health,3 in determining what remedy was due to appellants
who successfully challenged the constitutionality of Massachusetts'
marriage licensing requirements. 54
Although similar parallels have been hard to find with respect to the
use of human rights treaties, this group of "receptive" jurists can
arguably be defined more broadly to include the vocal judicial advocates
of independent state constitutionalism, including, for example, retired
Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court, and Senior Justice
Ellen Ash Peters of the Connecticut Supreme Court. Both justices have
argued that state jurists should take into account their own unique
history, culture, and legal tradition when interpreting the state
constitution, and both have looked to international human rights law as a
way to begin to articulate unique state constitutional standards.
In Sterling v. Cupp, 5 6 Justice Linde wrote for a divided Supreme
Court that the Oregon Constitution bars cross-gender patdowns of
Courtroom: Judging in the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 273, 276 (1997)
(authored by Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and former law clerk to
Justice Abrahamson respectively).
52. The Honorable Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn
From Their Children": Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global
Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1633, 1641-43 (2004).
53. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
54. See id. at 969 (concurring with the remedy used by the Court of Appeals for
Ontario to confront the problem as "entirely consonant with established principles of
jurisprudence empowering a court to refine a common-law principle in light of evolving
constitutional standards").
55. See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA.
L. REv. 165 (1984); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States'Bill of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980); Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away From the Federal
Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1543, 1545 (1997)
("State courts succeed by drawing on their own heritage, their own constitutions, their
own common law, and their own statutes to craft and apply a broad range of
jurisprudential principles that often differ substantially from those that govern the federal
courts. State courts might, of course, more completely satisfy these serious
responsibilities if their work had the benefit of sustained academic input."). See also
Ellen A. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on the Historic Role of the State
Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1065 (1998). These groups are in some
cases overlapping. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw.
L.J. 951, 955 (1982).
56. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981).
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prisoners' sexually intimate bodily areas, except in cases where a
patdown was necessitated by the immediate circumstances." In reaching
this holding, Linde noted that the Oregon Constitution has five
provisions regarding the treatment of prisoners that have no federal
counterpart,58 including a provision "confin[ing] 'rigorous' treatment of
prisoners within constitutional bounds of necessity."59 In determining
that unnecessary cross-gender patdown searches violated this guarantee,
Justice Linde drew on a variety of sources including the standards
adopted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the American Bar Association,
and the American Correctional Association. Linde also noted that "the
same principles [that animate these standards] have been a worldwide
concern recognized by the United Nations and other multinational
bodies," and then cited the relevant provisions of the UDHR and the
ICCPR.60 The international human rights instruments function in this
decision not as binding authority,6' but as persuasive evidence of a
shared concept of dignity.
Similarly in Moore v. Ganim,62  a case challenging the
constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that limited the general
assistance benefits that employable persons could receive to no more
63than nine months in a year, Justice Ellen Ash Peters, writing in
concurrence, relied on the UDHR to argue for finding a governmental
obligation under the Connecticut Constitution to provide for minimal
subsistence. 4  She tied the provision of welfare to "contemporary
notions about democracy and universal suffrage," 6 5 as articulated in
UDHR article 25(1), which declares that:[E]veryone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.66
57. See id. at 136-37.
58. See id at 127-28 (stating that the United States Constitution "does not go beyond
bills of attainder and 'cruel and unusual punishments"' while "[s]tate constitutions, by
contrast, often contain clauses expressly directed toward guaranteeing humane treatment
of those prosecuted for crime").
59. Id. at 128 (citing OR. CONST. art. I, § 13).
60. Id. at 131; see id. at 131-32 n.21 (citing the UDHR and ICCPR).
61. The ICCPR was not ratified until 1992. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
62. Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742 (Conn. 1995).
63. See id; CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 17-273b (1993).
64. See Ganim, 660 A.2d at 780-81.
65. Id. at 780.
66. Id. at 780 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/811
(1948)).
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Although Justice Peters recognized that the UDHR does not bind
the United States, she nonetheless asserted that "the wide international
agreement on at least the hortatory goals identified in the human rights
documents strongly supports the plaintiffs claim." 67
Thus, individual judges may play a significant role in incorporating
international and comparative sources into state jurisprudence. Those
who are more likely to do so appear to also favor robust state
constitutionalism and therefore are looking for supporting sources to help
articulate the state's constitutional vision.
2. Modeling the Behavior of Other Courts
A second way that the soft law approach appears in state court cases
is when the court is modeling the practice adopted by other courts in a
particular type of case. The clearest example of this path comes in the
death penalty context. In Roper v. Simmons,68 the Supreme Court
67. Ganim, 660 A.2d at 781. Interestingly, there are more examples of state court
reliance on the non-binding UDHR to incorporate human rights norms in state
constitutional and statutory interpretation than reliance on either the ratified or unratified
human rights treaties. See, e.g., Am. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm., 32 Cal. 3d 603, 608 n.4 (Cal. 1982) (noting the similar language found in both
Art. 1, section 8 of the California Constitution and Art. 2 of the UDHR); City of Santa
Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 n.2 (Cal. 1980) (identifying numerous
provisions within the UDHR as support for the right to privacy in one's home); Bixby v.
Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143 n.9, 145 n.12 (Cal. 1971) (citing to the UDHR when
discussing California courts' protection of the right to practice one's trade or profession
from "the massive apparatus of government."); Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App.
3d 494, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (citing the UDHR as support for its conclusion that it
would be "inhumane and shocking to the conscience" to deny low income residents of
Merced County, California an appropriate allowance for each of the basic necessities of
life, including minimum medical assistance); In re Barbara White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (striking down a condition of probation that placed limits on the
right of petitioner to travel in certain parts of the city as violating the U.S. and California
Constitutions and noting that the fundamental right to travel is protected in the UDHR);
Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Dept. of Educ., 396 N.W.2d 373, 408 (Mich. 1986)
(Riley, J. dissenting) (arguing that the UDHR supports parental autonomy in directing the
education of children); Wilson v. Hacker, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461, 472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950)
(invoking the UDHR as demonstrative of a commitment towards the elimination of
gender discrimination); Beck v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 125 Misc. 2d 771, 775 n.5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (referring to the UDHR when acknowledging that certain human
rights violations violate accepted standards of international law); Jamur Prod. Corp. v.
Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 509-510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (recognizing the UDHR as a
valuable authority when evaluating whether certain conduct should be deemed
actionable); Eggert v. Seattle, 505 P.2d 801, 802 (Wash. 1973) (relying on the UDHR as
supplemental authority in striking down a Seattle ordinance that imposed a one year
durational residency requirement upon applicants for civil service positions because the
legislation restricted one's freedom of movement). This may be due to the longer history
of the UDHR or to the fact that reference to this instrument avoids the complicated
question of its level of binding authority.
68. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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controversially considered international treaty law and comparative law
sources in reaching its conclusion that the Eighth Amendment bars the
69
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles. In so doing, the Supreme
Court was actually following the lead of the Missouri courts, which had
relied on these same sources in making their original determination.70
Since that decision, litigants have raised treaty law norms in other
Eighth Amendment claims and, following the Supreme Court's lead,
some state courts have been willing to consider these sources. For
example, in People v. Pratcher,71 a California appellate court considered
a challenge by a juvenile defendant to the constitutionality of a 50-year
72sentence. Citing Roper, Pratcher argued that there is an international
consensus against sentencing minors to life imprisonment.73 The court
considered the international sources, with particular emphasis on the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, but determined that the lack of
legislative or judicial consensus in the United States against lengthy
sentences for juveniles was dispositive.74 Although the defendant's
claim was ultimately rejected, the court did adopt the Supreme Court's
method of considering the treaty's guarantees and its level of acceptance
in the international community as a potentially persuasive argument.7 5
States also model other state courts' treatment of these instruments,
even without federal mediation. For example, in Bott v. DeLand," the
Utah Supreme Court held that a prisoner may recover damages under the
Utah Constitution if the prisoner can show either deliberate indifference
or unnecessary abuse.7 7 In determining the meaning of "unnecessary
abuse," the court looked to and relied upon Justice Linde's decision in
Sterling v. Cupp. 78 The court noted the grounding of the Oregon court's
69. Id.
70. State ex. rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 411 (Mo. 2003). Before
examining this type of evidence, the court noted that the practice had been applied by the
United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). See Simmons,
112 S.W. 3d at 405.
71. People v. Pratcher, No. Al 17112, 2009 WL 2332183 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 30,
2009).
72. Id.
73. Id. at *49-50.
74. Id.
75. See id. This is not to suggest that all state courts have adopted this trend. In a
case decided by the same court a couple of months earlier, the court rejected the
international treaty claims simply by noting that the CRC has not been ratified and "is
also not binding on us." See People v. Dyleski, No. Al 15725, 2009 WL 1114077 at *36
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2009).
76. Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by
Spackman ex. rel. Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder County Sch. Dist.,16 P.3d 533
(Ut. 2000).
77. Bott, 922 P.2d at 737-40.
78. Id. at 740-41.
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decision in the "internationally accepted standards of humane treatment
as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted by the First
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders in 1995."79
These two types of opinions represent a small subset of the already
small pool of state court decisions referencing international human rights
treaties. Despite their rarity, these decisions are powerful because of the
norms they establish and the way in which these norms are then
transmitted vertically and horizontally among state and federal courts.
The conditions under which these decisions have occurred suggest a
strategy for maximizing the occurrence of this phenomenon. Given that
individual jurists appear to play a key role in incorporating these
instruments into state court decisions, more attention should perhaps be
paid to identifying them. The judicial philosophies of the U.S. Supreme
Court are well-known-and the particular leanings of the federal circuits
are certainly considered by advocates seeking a friendly forum for
particular rights-related claims. These cases suggest that similar
attention should be paid to understanding state courts, despite the
additional complexity of doing so. Given that the jurists who have used
international or comparative human rights law tend to also seem (at least
in some cases) to be advocates of independent state constitutionalism,
states with established primacy or interstitial methods of state
constitutional interpretation80 will likely include some judges or justices
who are receptive to these types of claims. Additionally, there may be
personal or professional characteristics shared by those judges and
justices that predict a greater openness or comfort with these types of
claims.8' Even a single jurist, such as Justice Peters in Moore, may be
responsive to treaty-based arguments and find ways to incorporate these
norms into the conversation. And once the arguments are present in one
state's jurisprudence, they may then become more persuasive to other
courts at the state and federal level.
79. Id.
80. The primacy approach, as outlined by then-Professor Linde, requires courts to
consider state constitutional claims before reaching claims under the federal constitution.
See Robert Williams, 77 Miss. L.J. 225, 239 (2007) (citing Hans A. Linde, Without "Due
Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 135 (1970)). The
interstitial approach to state constitutional interpretation reverses the order. The state
constitutional issue is examined only if the federal claim fails. See Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141, 1171-72 (1985).
81. For example, both Justice Linde and Chief Justice Marshall were born and spent
significant parts of their youth outside of the United States. Thanks to fellow Symposium
author Bob Williams for this insight.
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B. International Human Rights Treaty Law as Binding
In the remaining opinions, which constitute the large majority of the
sample, the treaties appear in the decisions because they have been raised
by the parties as binding law to be applied in the court, generally in the
context of the death penalty. Although most of these challenges have
failed, at least to the extent that the courts have consistently rejected
arguments that capital punishment is prohibited by these treaties, they
have contributed to a deeper and more localized dialogue about these
rights and their meaning, which in some instances has changed the
operative norms.
1. Coordinated Litigation Strategies
By far the most common scenario in which binding claims based on
the ratified international human treaties are introduced in state courts is
in challenges to the practice of capital punishment and life without
parole. Again, any relationship between the individual cases is difficult
to identify from the opinions themselves, but an external view suggests
that they are part of a coordinated litigation strategy.
Around the mid-1990s ... a transnational network of human rights
activists, NGOs, and defense lawyers began a campaign to bring
national criminal justice systems into conformity with the abolition of
the death penalty in the ICCPR. In countries where capital
punishment persisted-most notably the United States-the network
of these "norm entrepreneurs" worked to limit the application of the
death penalty through novel arguments rooted in emerging
international and foreign practices.82
In this context, it seems plausible to characterize the increase in
frequency of these claims in state court opinions as resulting in part from
coordinated and concerted effort. The notable appearance of human
rights law in Supreme Court opinions striking down some applications of
the death penalty has likely led advocates to raise treaty-based claims in
more cases, if only for preservation in the event of future changes in the
law.83  Significantly, however, the successful treaty-based arguments
were not based on their use as binding authority.
Despite the failure of these arguments to effect direct change in
particular cases, coordinated campaigns raising claims based on
82. Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights
Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393, 413 (2006).
83. The North Carolina courts have explicitly referred to these claims in a section of
the opinion on "preservation issues." See, e.g., State v. Allen, 626 S.E.2d 271, 287 (N.C.
2006).
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international treaty law may help to build awareness of and engagement
with these instruments among both jurists and litigants, even if the claims
are unsuccessful. Moreover, the awareness they create may result in
adoption of the right or the norm outside of the courts. This has
happened in the death penalty context. Despite formal rejection of the
argument that international treaty law requires the abolition of the death
penalty, reliance on capital punishment has decreased in the United
States, assisted in some instances by decisions of the United States
Supreme Court limiting the contexts in which it is permissible.84 A
similar phenomenon occurred in litigation surrounding U.S. compliance
with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Professor Janet
Koven Levit explains that by the time the United States Supreme Court
rejected the possibility of a judicial remedy for violations of the right to
consular notification, the "core goal of Vienna Convention litigation,
compliance, had been met."85 In other words, despite the fact that courts
have generally rejected the possibility of mandating a remedy for VCCR
violations, the ongoing vertical and horizontal dialogue on these
instruments has resulted in an increase in state and local compliance with
the treaty's notification requirement. Therefore, even rejected treaty
claims may, in certain circumstances, ultimately have rights-enhancing
effects.
2. Interbranch Debates
A second way that binding claims have been raised is through inter-
branch dialogue at the state level. In other words, the court is asked to
consider the legality of another branch's interaction with the treaty. In
California, the legislature passed legislation defining a term in the state
constitution in accordance with CERD in order to permit some forms of
preferential treatment based on race. 8 6 This legislative action prompted
84. See Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal
Integration of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 759-60 (2006)
("While the United States in the exercise of its foreign affairs powers has become more
sophisticated in its use of reservations, understandings and declarations to limits its
obligations under the central human rights regimes ... and has become more confident in
its rejection of other multilateral regimes . . . practice within U.S. courts has moved closer
to the international standards in the one area where it has steadfastly rejected
international influence: the death penalty.") (citiations omitted).
85. See Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellin Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 630
(2008). Levit interviewed a variety of actors in the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma, as a way of
demonstrating how the "bottom up" story of the Vienna Convention differs from the "top
down" account of Supreme Court and International Court of Justice decisions. Id.
86. CERD specifically permits the use of "special measures securing adequate
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection,"
which may conflict with the limitations the Supreme Court has placed on the use of
affirmative action programs.
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numerous legal challenges, and in C & C Construction v. Sacramento
Municipal Utility District, a California appeals court determined that
the legislature had unconstitutionally infringed on the power of the courts
to interpret the constitution. Professor J. Owens Smith, who was
responsible for the research and drafting of the legislation, said in the
aftermath of the decision that the state court erred in failing to accord the
appropriate weight to the ratified treaty. 8 9 "The state constitution should
be subordinate to the human rights treaty," he said.90 "The CERD
definition, the Supreme Law of the Land, should have trumped the state
law."91
A few years later, this argument got its day in court. In Coral
Construction, Inc. v. City of San Francisco,92 the appellate court was
asked to strike down a San Francisco business ordinance that required
race- and gender-conscious remedies in the awarding of city contracts as
a means of ameliorating the effects of past discrimination. The court
again concluded that the California legislature's enactment of Section
8315 amounted to a legislative attempt to amend the state constitution
without following the proper procedures for amendment. 9 4  The City
contended that C&C was wrongly decided because:
87. C & C Const., Inc. v. Sacramento Mun. Utility Dist., Cal. Rptr. 3d 715 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
88. The Court explained that "Assembly Bill No. 703 amounted to an attempt by the
Legislature and the Governor to amend the California Constitution without complying
with the procedures for amendment. This attempt was manifestly beyond their
constitutional authority." Id. at 726. The California Supreme Court declined to review
the case. The relationship between CERD and the provision in question, and the state's
obligations with respect to CERD, were raised for the first time on appeal and thus
summarily dismissed. Id. at 726-27. The court did note, however, that CERD permits
"special measures" only to ensure certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals "equal
enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . ." Id. (citing CERD
art. 1 § 4). The court determined that the decision to ban affirmative action programs by
referendum meant that the California citizenry had determined that "special measures are
not only unnecessary to ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms in California, but
inimical to those principles." Id. at 727. Therefore, the court concluded that the special
measures authorized by CERD "are not permitted in California, even under the
Convention." Id.
89. Martha Davis, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: States, Municipalities, and
International Human Rights, in BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 127, 142-43 (Soohoo, Albisa & Davis, eds. 2008).
90. Kalb, supra note 19.
91. Id. at 143.
92. Coral Constr., Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 781 (Dist. Ct. App.-
1st 2007).
93. Id. at 783.
94. Id. at 792. Prior to the legislative enactment, the Supreme Court had adopted the
dictionary meaning of the term "discriminate" in the Constitution. See Hi-Voltage Wire
Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 24 Cal. 4th 537, 559-60 (2000).
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the Legislature's power to enact Section 8315 does not arise under
state law. Rather, in this instance, the California Legislature was
acting pursuant to an express federal duty placed upon it by the
United States Senate to execute a United States treaty within its
jurisdiction. Because the Legislature's power to act derived from
federal rather than state law, it was superior to Proposition 209 and
validly exercised without the need for a constitutional amendment. 95
The court rejected this argument as violative of separation of powers and
federalism, reasoning that the "Legislature's duty to respond to a federal
treaty does not come fortified with federal superpowers enabling it to
bypass the judicial and amendatory processes." 96  The court then
considered the city's alternative argument, that Section 8315 was
preempted by the Race Convention's definition of discrimination. 97 The
court agreed that that this would be true if the laws conflicted, but the
court concluded that the CERD does not require the use of race-based
affirmative action programs. 9 8
Although the outcome in this case was ultimately disappointing for
affirmative action proponents, this case is arguably still a success for
domestic enforcement of international human rights. State level
incorporation of the treaty's norm occurred legislatively and was then
challenged in the courts. The court accepted the binding authority of the
treaty, but rejected the proponents' interpretation of what the instrument
required.
These two categories of cases may be lost post-Medellin, although
these claims should continue to be raised at least until the Court weighs
in again on the problem of non-self-execution. This course of action
may have little immediate impact on the outcome of cases in which
treaty law is raised as binding authority. This study suggests that courts
have not generally been receptive to these claims. Nonetheless, the loss
of even the minimal attention that is currently given to these claims as
they are raised repeatedly in different courts impoverishes the
conversation about these rights and may slow the progress toward their
acceptance through other channels. Additionally, Medellin could
eliminate the possibility of the latter type of case in which courts
consider the treaty implementation efforts of other branches. While
95. Coral Constr., Inc., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 792-93. Specifically, the court noted that the CERD Committee "views the
Race Convention as requiring adoption of race-based remedies in the face of persistent
inequities while the State Department interprets the companion provisions as calling for a
permissive approach." Id at 793. The court concluded, however, that deference was due
to the State Department as the Executive agency responsible for the negotiation and
enforcement of the treaty. Id
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under an earlier understanding of the doctrine, states and localities had
the (unenforceable) obligation and mandate to implement ratified
treaties, this space for sub-national innovation disappears if these
instruments have no meaning in domestic law absent federal
legislation.99
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
From this study it appears that state courts, with notable exceptions,
have been somewhat slow to answer the call to engage with international
human rights treaty law. In some ways, the absence here parallels the
failure of independent state constitutionalism more generally. 00 Indeed,
some of the barriers are likely similar. At the technical level, state courts
face considerably larger case loads and may be more vulnerable to the
political consequences of accepting treaty-based claims.'o' Their ability
to consider these claims may also be limited by their own lack of
expertise with these materials, and by the failure of the parties to make
arguments based on international or comparative sources.
To the extent that these explanations are valid,102 many of these
barriers are already in the process of being overcome.10 3 Increasingly,
there are educational opportunities for state court judges to learn to
handle international claims. For example, international materials are
becoming more accessible in legal education. More law clerks (and
future judges) will be exposed in law school to basic international law
principles and will have the opportunity to apply these principles in a
human rights clinic. Additionally, interest has grown among American
lawyers in the area of international human rights law. "Like judges, they
are meeting with their global counterparts and being exposed to new
ideas.... Legal organizations like the ACLU and the ABA now have
conferences on international law and international human rights, such as
the ACLU Human Rights at Home: International Law in U.S. Courts
99. The California example is the only one I have been able to locate where this kind
of dialogue occurred. I have argued elsewhere, however, that under the pre-Medellin
understanding of the law, the federalism understanding presents a powerful opening for
international states and localities to experiment with implementing ratified treaty law
without fear of preemption. See generally Johanna Kalb, The Persistence of Dualism in
Human Rights Treaty Implementation 30 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. (forthcoming 2012).
100. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH L. REV. 761 (1992).
101. See Penny J. White, Legal, Political, and Ethical Hurdles to Applying
International Human Rights Law in the State Courts of the United States (and Arguments
for Scaling Them), 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 937, 958-61 (2003).
102. See Gardner, supra note 100, at 810-12.
103. See Martha Davis, Public Rights, Global Perspectives, and Common Law, 36
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 653 (2009).
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Conference."' 04 Thus, to the extent that the explanation is logistical, it is
likely that we will see an increase in the use of these sources as the
consideration of these instruments becomes easier. 0 5
Alternatively, it is possible that there is a more fundamental tension
between the project of state constitutionalism and that of international
human rights law that is blocking broader engagement with these
instruments at the state level. The normative justification for
independent state constitutionalism-that is, one that goes beyond the
instrumental value of incorporating at the state level policies that cannot
be implemented nationally-is that state constitutions do and should
reflect the variations in the polity. In this view, a "state constitution is a
fit place for the people of a state to record their moral values, their
definition of justice, their hopes for a common good. A state constitution
defines a way of life." 06 James Gardner has argued that this model does
not reflect the reality of the United States' modern political community
and that this "type of robust state constitutionalism ... could pose a
serious threat to the nationwide stability and sense of community that
nationalism constitutionalism provides."' 07 These critiques are equally
applicable to the use of international human rights law in the project of
state constitutionalism in that they undermine the legitimacy of state-
level innovation. Moreover, the use of international human rights law to
advance this project presents an additional challenge given the tension
between the universal principles these instruments embody and the
promotion of distinct and distinctive state constitutions.
My purpose here is not to resolve either the pragmatic or normative
challenges to international state constitutionalism. Rather, my focus has
been on what the limited existing state court jurisprudence reveals about
the instrumental possibilities of international state constitutionalism as an
advocacy strategy. In that vein, this study suggests that even if these
structural barriers are not resolved, advocates may beneficially engage
state courts with these issues with meaningful results and offers some
strategic guidance as to where these efforts are most likely to be
successful. Somewhat counter-intuitively, it appears that most direct
impact of this kind of treaty law is likely to come from its least direct
applications. As an authoritative (but not binding) source of widely
shared norms, these instruments are persuasive to judges developing new
understandings of state constitutional law. Conversely, the arguments
104. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Transnational Law as a Domestic Resource: Thoughts
on the Case of Women's Rights, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 689, 699 (2004).
105. See Davis, supra note 103, at 681.
106. A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING
ISSUEs ST. CoNsT. L. 12, 14 (1988).
107. Gardner, supra note 100, at 818.
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based on these treaties as a binding source of law have been less
successful in the courts, but have contributed to the adoption of the
norms via other channels.
Given these findings, the Medellin decision need not be fatal to the
prospects of international constitutionalism. The experience reflected in
this study suggests that advocates should continue to raise alternative soft
law uses for international human rights treaties in state courts.1os Despite
the fact that many of the norms embodied in the UDHR are found in the
ICCPR and in CERD, two treaties that the United States has ratified, 109
arguments based on their persuasive value (as well as the persuasive
value of the UDHR) seem to have gained more traction with state
courts.110 It is possible that the ambiguity surrounding the domestic
enforceability of these treaties, which will only be enhanced by Medellin,
causes hesitance among state court judges to wade into a complex and
confusing debate. And given that ratified treaties at least arguably have
the status of federal law and must be applied consistently, state courts
may be reluctant to move forward on binding treaty-based claims absent
federal leadership. Thus, somewhat counterintuitively, this study
suggests that state courts may be more receptive to soft law claims based
on treaty law, whether ratified or unratified. This is certainly not to say
that nothing is lost if the facial reading of Medellin is ultimately upheld,
but it may mean that at least this valuable type of human rights advocacy
can proceed relatively unhindered.
108. This generally appears to be happening, except in some parts of the death penalty
practice. Increasingly, however, my review of the cases suggests that advocates seem to
be making alternative arguments-that the human rights instruments are both binding and
persuasive authority.
109. As Professor Tara Melish notes, there is "wide overlap in the rights protected in
distinct human rights treaties. CEDAW, CRC, and ICESCR subject matters are thus
regularly taken up through ICCPR, CERD, CAT, and [International Labor Organization]
convention supervisory procedures." Tara Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The
United States and Human Rights, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 389, 397 n. 34 (2009). Thus, were
advocates looking to make binding arguments based on ratified treaties, they could
arguably do so under the existing legal regime. The fact that they in many cases do not
suggests an understanding of the nuances I have identified here.
110. The clearest example of this is in the death penalty context with the Supreme
Court's acceptance of the persuasive authority of these treaties in Roper and Atkins.
Nonetheless, this phenomenon is pervasive. In the Opportunity Agenda's 2008 report on
international law in state courts, all but one of the fourteen state court decisions that they
consider to be "highlights" of the practice involve the persuasive, non-binding citation of
authority. See OPPORTUNiTY AGENDA, supra note 4, at 6-7 (listing cases).
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